Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 39
Issue 5 November 2006

Article 13

2006

The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005: Embodying U.S. Values to
Eliminate Detainee Abuse by Civilian Contractors and Bounty
Hunters in Afghanistan and Iraq
Ryan P. Logan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Military, War, and
Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Ryan P. Logan, The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005: Embodying U.S. Values to Eliminate Detainee Abuse
by Civilian Contractors and Bounty Hunters in Afghanistan and Iraq, 39 Vanderbilt Law Review 1605
(2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol39/iss5/13

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

NOTES

The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005:
Embodying U.S. Values to Eliminate
Civilian
by
Abuse
Detainee
Contractors and Bounty Hunters in
Afghanistan and Iraq
ABSTRACT

The growth in the number of bounty hunters and civilian
contractors accompanying the U.S. military into battle has
swelled during the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Civilians have been utilized in all facets of those military
campaigns, including the interrogationof suspected terroristsor
insurgents. Faced with intense pressure to rapidly obtain
information about terrorist operations and yet having little
oversight of their interrogation activities, some of these
contractors and bounty hunters have been accused of abusing
detainees. This Note explores the legal avenues for addressing
accusations of detainee abuse by U.S. civilians in Afghanistan
and Iraq and concludes that those offenses should be prosecuted
in U.S. courts to ensure swift and efficient justice and protect
the rights of the accused. The Author critiques several other
proposed legal avenues, including international bodies, hostcountry justice, and civil suits in U.S. federal courts. Finally,
the Note discusses the Detainee Treatment Act and argues that
it provides the most comprehensive legal solution to the detainee
abuse problem by promoting clear, uniform standards of
interrogation, closing loopholes in existing criminal statutes,
and allowing for a reasonableperson defense by the accused.
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I. INTRODUCTION

After the collapse of the Soviet Union caused the military threat
of communism to dissipate, the U.S. military underwent a quiet
revolution that transformed the size and structure of future military
operations. From 1989 to 2000, both the U.S. defense budget and the
number of military personnel were reduced by approximately 40%.1
Apart from the Gulf War in 1990-1991, which involved approximately
500,000 soldiers, the U.S. military found itself involved in small,
2
target engagements such as those in Panama, Somalia, and Haiti.
The attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq, produced an immediate need for long-term
engagements that required higher military expenditures and
personnel. 3 Since 2001, the Department of Defense's base budget has

1.

Karen L. Douglas, Contractors Accompanying the Force: Empowering

Commanders with Emergency ChangeAuthority, 55 A.F. L. REV. 127, 131 (2004).
2.
The Unfinished War: A Decade since Desert Storm, http://www.cnn.com/
SPECIALS/2001/gulf.war/facts/gulfwar/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
3.

See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 87 (Department of Defense Budget), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/pdf/budget/defense.pdf.
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increased by 35%, to a total of $402 billion in fiscal year 2005. 4 To
cope with the demand for more soldiers, the Pentagon began the
largest reserve mobilization since the Second World War.5 Even with
the increased utilization of National Guard and Reserve soldiers, the
overall number of military personnel remained low when compared to
Cold War levels-as evidenced by the reduction in the number of
active army divisions from eighteen at the end of the Cold War to ten
6
today.
As a result of the downsizing, the Pentagon increasingly relies on
private citizens to perform many tasks in war zones. These activities
include everything from supplying fuel for convoys to providing food
for soldiers and personal security services for important officials. 7 In
order to promote the capture of notorious terrorists, the U.S. military
also offered bounties for Osama Bin Laden and many members of
Saddam Hussein's regime, who were identified in the infamous deck
of cards that gained prominence in the media during the early days of
the Iraq War.8 The prospect of large financial awards, coupled with a
post-9/11 surge in patriotism, caused many veterans and other
individuals to head to Afghanistan or Iraq in order to obtain those
bounties. 9 This led some soldiers returning from the war zones to
compare those areas to the Wild West of the American frontier. 10
The characterization of the new U. S. military frontiers as the
Wild West may not be too far from the truth. In both Afghanistan and
Iraq, the U.S. military focuses its efforts on fighting an insurgency
that has maintained its intensity since the beginning of the military
conflicts. Searching for ways to reduce the insurgencies, officials
settled on a strategy to ramp up detention and interrogation
activity.1 1 Due to the grueling nature of the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq and the heightened focus on information-gathering, the U.S.
military has become embroiled in several detainee abuse scandals,

4.

Id.

5.
Julian E. Barnes, Guard Faces Phase-Out of Combat Role, L.A. TIMES, May
8, 2006, at 1.
6.
Brigadier Gen. Daniel Kaufman, Dean of Academic Bd., U.S. Military Acad.
at West Point, Where in the World is the US Army?, MIT Securities Studies Program
Seminars (Oct. 16, 2002), available at http://web.mit.edu/SSP/fall02/fall02.html.
7.
See Douglas, supra note 1, at 133-34 (describing the various types of
battlefield contractors).
8.
See Dep't of Defense, Personality Identification Playing Cards,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2003/pipclOO42003.html
(last visited Oct. 1,
2006).
9.

See Peter Bergen, The Shadow Warrior, ROLLING STONE, May 19, 2005, at

57.
10.
Eric Wedeking, Army Guardsman Completes Special Duty in Afghanistan,
DEFENDAMERICA NEWS, Feb. 10, 2003, available at http://www.defendamerica.mil/
profiles/feb2OO3/prO21OO3a.html.
11.
Scott Wilson & Sewell Chan, As Insurgency Grew, So Did Prison Abuse,
WASH. POST, May 10, 2004, at A01. For example, the number of prisoners at Abu
Ghraib rose from 5,800 to 8,000 in five months. Id.
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12
most notably the incidents that occurred at Abu Ghraib prison.
Private civilians, who have been heavily involved in Afghanistan and
Iraq, have also been implicated as playing key roles in the torture of
13
detainees.
This Note explores the legal avenues available for dealing with
U.S. civilian contractors or bounty hunters who stand accused of
detainee abuse. Section II traces the history of the involvement of
U.S. civilians in military conflicts and introduces the problem of
contractors and bounty hunters who torture. Section III examines
three different approaches for addressing this newly emerging and
critical legal problem. Each approach offers benefits, such as
promoting international cooperation and achieving swift and efficient
justice, but ultimately fails to provide a comprehensive and effective
solution to the problem.
The first of the three approaches utilizes international
institutions, such as the International Convention Against the
Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries
(Convention Against Mercenaries) and the International Criminal
Court (ICC). While this approach promises justice in a neutral
international forum, the narrow language of the Convention Against
Mercenaries renders it inapplicable to most torture cases, and the
ICC fails to adequately protect the rights of U.S. citizens. The second
approach entails turning over the accused party for trial in foreign
judicial systems. This approach is best exemplified by the case of the
recently convicted Jack Idema, a bounty hunter who had constructed
his own private prison in Afghanistan. 14 Because justice can be
swiftly rendered in the country where the alleged torture occurred,
this method may provide more immediate resolution than
international judicial institutions. Unfortunately, future detainee
abuse cases that are the focus of this Note will arise in fledgling
democracies such as Afghanistan, with developing legal systems illequipped to address the complex legal issues involved in the torture
cases and protect the rights of the accused. The third approach
pursues civil remedies, such as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the
Torture Victims Protection Act, and criminal remedies under the War
Crimes Act. However, the proposed civil remedies fail to redress the
wrongs since they only apply to officially sanctioned state torture
while War Crimes Act prosecutions are unrealistic.
Section IV of this Note proposes a solution that addresses the
problem of detainee abuse by U.S. civilians in military conflicts.
Currently, the U.S. government is utilizing the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) and the Patriot Act to

12.
13.
14.

Tara McKelvey, Torture, Inc., LEGAL AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 13.
Id.
Bergen, supranote 9, at 61.
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prosecute a civil contractor who interrogated a detainee in
Afghanistan. 15 The landmark case of David Passaro, a CIA contractor
accused of beating a prisoner to death, is currently underway in a
U.S. District Court in North Carolina. 16 He is the first U.S. civilian to
17
be tried in federal court for detainee abuse in Afghanistan or Iraq.
Although Passaro's prosecution offers an important test case, the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 offers a more comprehensive solution
to the problem of civilians who abuse detainees.1 8 The Detainee
Treatment Act establishes detailed interrogation standards, applies
to all prisoners regardless of their location, and allows for a
reasonable defense for accused torturers. 19 Section V concludes by
reviewing the legal approaches for addressing detainee abuse by U.S.
civilians and connecting the solution to broader U.S. values.

II. CONTRACTORS AND BOUNTY HUNTERS IN WAR ZONES

The U.S. government has employed civilians throughout its
history. In the Revolutionary War, George Washington used civilian
drivers to haul supplies. 20 The Pentagon employed contractors to
21
transport supplies and maintain railroads during the Korean War.
In Vietnam, the United States hired civilians to provide construction,
22
energy supplies, and technological support.
The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union
provided greater opportunities for reductions in U.S. military forces
and civilian involvement in non-combat positions. The Soviet Union's
collapse coincided with a national consensus in favor of deficit
reduction during the 1990s, as evidenced by the Presidential
candidacy of Ross Perot in 1992.23 Perot focused on the issue of deficit
reduction and consequently had the best showing by a third-party
Presidential candidate since Theodore Roosevelt. 24 The Department

15.

Farah Stockman, CIA Contractoris Charged in Beating of Afghan Detainee,

BOSTON GLOBE, June 18, 2004, at Al.
16.
Id.
17.
Id.

18.
(2005).
19.

Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739
Id. §§ 1002-04.

20.
Douglas, supranote 1, at 130.
21.
Id.
22.
Gordon L. Campbell, U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command,
Contractors on the Battlefield: The Ethics of Paying Civilians to Enter Harm's Way
and Requiring Soldiers to Depend on Them, Presentation to the Joint Services
Conference on Professional Ethics (Jan. 27-28, 2000), available at http://www.usafa.af.
mil/jscope/JSCOPEOO/CampbellOO.html.
23.
See James Carney, Oh Deficit, Where is Thy Sting?, TIME ONLINE, Feb. 14,
2003, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,422899,00.html.
24.
Id.
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of Defense, which typically accounts for roughly half of all
discretionary (non-entitlement) spending, offered many opportunities
to help in reducing the deficit. 25 Unsurprisingly, the Pentagon's
26
budget declined noticeably during the 1990s.
The Gulf War of 1990-1991 presented the first opportunity for
large-scale civilian involvement in military conflict. That involvement
was driven by several trends, including the downsizing of professional
soldiers, increased global instability, and a general trend towards
privatization. 27 During the Gulf War, the U.S. military used over
9,000 contractors to expel Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi army from
Kuwait.2 8 In Bosnia, the United States employed almost 6,000
contractors, a number roughly equal to the amount of U.S. military
personnel involved in the conflict. 29 From 1994-2002, the Pentagon
30
paid approximately $300 billion to private contractors.
Building upon the increase during the 1990s, the use of private
civilians greatly expanded in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
These large, expensive wars have provided ample opportunities for a
wide variety of civilian involvement. In Iraq, there are between
50,000 and 100,000 contractors, about 20,000 of whom are providing
security services.3 1 Some of those services have included providing
security for the Coalition Provisional Authority officials when they
ran Iraq and protecting various oil and infrastructure projects
throughout the nation.32 Contractors are drawn to the high salaries,
which can be as much as $20,000 a month for security personnel and
$100,000 per year for blue-collar workers.33 Some former Special
Forces Soldiers have left their positions with the military to become
34
civilian contractors.

25.

See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, FY06 BUDGET PRIORITIES,

TABLE S-2, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/tables.html (last visited Oct.
21, 2006).
26.
Budget Fact and Fantasy, AIR FORCE MAG., Oct. 2000, available at
http://www.afa.org/magazine/Oct2000/10Obudget-print.html. The Pentagon's budget
declined from approximately $345 billion in 1991 to $277 billion by 1998. Id.
27.
P. W. Singer, Outsourcing War, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 119-20.
28.
Douglas, supra note 1, at 130.
29.
Id.
30.
P.W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military
Firms and InternationalLaw, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 521, 522 (2004).
31.
Tom Regan, US Troops, Security ContractorsIncreasingly At Odds in Iraq,
CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR ONLINE,

June 13,

2005, http://www.csmonitor.comJ2005/

0613/dailyUpdate.html.
32.
Ellen L. Frye, Note, Private Military Firms in the New World Order: How
Redefining "Mercenary" Can Tame the Dogs of War, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2607, 2610
(2005).
33.
Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in
Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 511, 515
(2005).
34.
Id.
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The government sees several advantages to using contractors
instead of military personnel. First, using civilians allows the
Pentagon to focus on its "core competency," which is fighting military
battles. 35 Second, by staffing contractors, the military can reduce
recruiting efforts and focus more resources toward the retention of
current servicemen. 36 This is especially important given the recent
recruiting problem faced by the Army. 37 The recruiting problem is
exemplified by a Pentagon policy which offers citizenship to noncitizen soldiers after one year of military service. 38 This policy has led
to an estimated 30,000 non-citizens currently serving in the U.S.
military. 39 Finally, there are some political benefits of using private
civilians in conflicts. The deaths of private military contractors are
not included among official estimates of U.S. war casualties, which
given the political sensitivity of combat casualties, can serve40 to
artificially lower the actual number of U.S. deaths in foreign wars.
The U.S. government has also created huge financial incentives
for bounty hunters in Afghanistan and Iraq. Shortly after 9/11, the
United States offered a $25 million bounty for the capture of Osama
Bin Laden and considered raising that amount to $50 million. 4 1 Some
commentators have even suggested offering up to $1 billion for the
capture of the elusive terrorist mastermind. 42 In Iraq, the U.S.
government paid $30 million for information that led to the deaths of
Saddam Hussein's two sons, Uday and Qusay. 43 In addition, the
government has offered to pay the $25 million bounty for the
information that led to the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the
leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, although no one has yet been found
eligible. 44 Altogether, the United States has paid more than $60
million through its Rewards for Justice program that compensates
informants or bounty hunters. 45 Former hostages in Iraq have even
delved into the shadowy world of bounty hunting, with one former

35.
Douglas, supra note 1, at 131.
36.
Id. at 132.
37.
Army Has Plan to Boost Signups, Oct. 11, 2005, http://www.military.com
The Army
announced
a
NewsContent/0, 13319,78436,00.html?ESRC=army.nl.
recruiting shortfall of almost 7,000 for the last fiscal year, the first shortfall since 1999.
Id.
38.
U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., Naturalization Information for Military
Personnel, http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/services/natz/MilitaryBrochurev7.htm
(last
visited Oct. 2, 2006).
39.
Frye, supra note 32, at 2618.
40.
Regan, supra note 31.
41.
Tim McGirk, A New Osama Push, TIME, Jan. 31, 2005, at 17.
42.
James D. Miller, A Billion for Bin Laden, TCS DAILY, Aug. 9, 2004,
http://www.techcentralstation.com/080904D.html.
43.
US Puts $13 m on Bomber's Head, THE AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 8, 2005, at 13.
44.
US: Nobody Yet Identified for Big Zarqawi Bounty, http://www.boston.com/
news/world/middleeast/artices/2006/6/08/us-nobody-yet-identified-for-big-zarqawi-b
ounty/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2006).
45.
Id.
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hostage offering money to anyone willing to track down and
"eliminate" his former captors.4 6 This atmosphere of privatized
combat and police operations has led unscrupulous individuals to
engage in questionable practices, including torturing victims in a
quest to achieve the goal of tracking down and finding terrorists.
The abuse of suspected terrorists or enemy combatants has
developed into a prominent scandal, which has damaged the
international reputation of the United States and perhaps fueled the
motivations of Islamic radicals battling the U.S. military in
Afghanistan and Iraq.4 7 The most well known incidents of abuse
occurred at the infamous Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Abuses at that
prison included the raping, beating, and choking of several
prisoners. 48 Several military personnel have been convicted for their
roles in that scandal-most notably Lynndie England, the private
who was famously photographed holding a detainee by a leash.4 9
Given the large number of civilian contractors working with the
military in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the smaller number of
roving bounty hunters in both countries, it was perhaps inevitable
that U.S. civilians would become embroiled in the torture scandal. A
report of abuses at Abu Ghraib prison by Major General George R.
Fay and Lieutenant General Anthony R. Jones disclosed that sixteen
of the forty-four instances of abuse involved private contractors. 50
However, none of the contractors implicated in the report have been
charged with any crime.5 1 Many contractors lacked adequate
training, with the Fay-Jones report finding that 35% of contract
interrogators "lacked formal military training as interrogators. '52 The
report also concluded that the military "had no training to fall back
on in the management, control, and discipline of these personnel.153
The vexing question remains how best the United States and the
rest of the world can deal with the growing problem of detainee abuse
by U.S. civilians in war zones. The goals of a legal solution to the
problem should be to bring accused criminals to justice in a swift, fair
and efficient manner; to protect the rights of U.S. citizens; and to

46.
Wood's Fellow Hostage Hires Bounty Hunters, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
June 26, 2005, available at http://www.smh.com.aulnews/world/woods.fellow-hostagehires-bounty-hunters2005/06/26/1119724523143.html?oneclick=true#.
47.
Wilson, supra note 11, at A01. Clerics such as Moqtada al-Sadr have
demanded trials for those accused of torture in Iraq, and warned of reprisals if trials
were not carried out. Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt has remarked that the torture scandal
at Abu Ghraib further soured the Iraqi public on the U.S. occupation. Id.
48.
McKelvey, supra note 12, at 13.
49.
Josh White, Reservist Sentenced to 3 Years for Abu Ghraib Abuse, WASH.
POST, Sept. 28, 2005, at A12.
50.
P. W. Singer, In Iraq, OutsourcedAbusers Out of Control, COLUMBIA STATE,
Sept. 14, 2004, at A9.
51.
Id.
52.
Id.
53.
Id.
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improve the damaged image of the United States before the
international community. Three legal avenues emerge as possible
solutions: prosecuting violators under international law or before
international tribunals, such as the ICC; prosecuting violators in the
countries where the alleged torture occurred; and prosecuting
violators in U.S. courts. Each of these methods varies widely in its
applicability to U.S. civilians overseas, standards of evidence, conduct
of the trial, and the protections offered to defendants.

III.

THREE APPROACHES TO PROSECUTING CIVILIANS ACCUSED OF
TORTURE

A. InternationalLegal Approaches
Several international legal avenues promise means of redressing
the problem of detainee abuse by U.S. contractors or bounty hunters.
In 1989, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Convention Against
Mercenaries. 54 The Convention Against Mercenaries fails as a viable
solution because its definitions would not cover most of the acts of
U.S. civilians involved in the war on terror. 55

54.
55.
1.

Frye, supra note 32, at 2630.
The Convention Against Mercenaries defines a mercenary as follows:
A mercenary is any person who:

(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed
conflict;
(b) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for
private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict,
material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to
combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party;
(c)
Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory
controlled by a party to the conflict;
(d)

Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and

(e)
Has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on official
duty as a member of its armed forces.
2.

A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation:

(a)
Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in
a concerted act of violence aimed at:
(i)
Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the constitutional
order of a State; or
(ii)

Undermining the territorial integrity of a state;

(b)
Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for significant
private gain and is prompted by the promise or payment of material
compensation;
(c)
Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such an act
is directed;
(d)

Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and
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The Convention Against Mercenaries would not apply to most
U.S. civilians engaged in Afghanistan or Iraq for several reasons.
First, bounty hunters and civilian contractors could successfully
argue that they were not recruited to "fight in an armed conflict," as
only a few civilians have actually engaged in combat operations in
Afghanistan or Iraq. 56 This argument eliminates the possibility of
civilians fitting into the first definition of mercenary. As for the
second definition of mercenary contained in that Convention, bounty
hunters and contractors were not recruited to participate in a
''concerted act of violence," but rather to provide specific services to
the U.S. government or to capture potential terrorists. 57 Civilians in
Afghanistan or Iraq could argue that, regardless of their recruitment,
they never aimed to "overthrow" the governments of those nations or
undermine their "territorial integrity," especially in post-Saddam
Iraq and the lawless tribal areas of Afghanistan. Finally, U.S.
civilians could argue that their "motivation" for participating in
activities in Afghanistan and Iraq was not the promise of "significant
personal gain," but rather a sense of patriotism (as many bounty
hunters have claimed) 58 or contractual obligations (as many private
contractors would probably maintain). Since the Convention Against
Mercenaries would be inapplicable to virtually all U.S. civilians in
Afghanistan and Iraq, other solutions, such as the ICC, must be
considered.
Many international human rights organizations have proposed
59
using the ICC as a neutral forum for providing international justice.
Despite the noble motivations of its founders, however, the ICC is a
non-starter to prosecute U.S. civilians for three reasons. First, the
ICC asserts jurisdiction over U.S. citizens, even though the United
States has not signed the treaty.60 Second, the ICC can be potentially
61
abused and manipulated by political opponents of U.S. policy.

(e)
Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory the
act is undertaken.
International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries, G.A. Res. 44/34, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/34 (Dec. 4, 1989) [hereinafter
Convention Against Mercenaries].
56.
Id.
1(a).
57.
Id.
2(a).
58.
See id. 2(b); Bergen, supra note 9, at 90.
59.
See generally Coal. for the Int'l Crim. Ct., http://www.iccnow.org (last
visited Oct. 1, 2006) (describing the C.I.C.C. as "the first permanent international
judicial body capable of trying individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity and
war crimes when national courts are unable or unwilling to do so"). The CICC contains
more than 2,000 organizations that promote international support for the ICC. Id.
60.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
61.
See id. at art. 17 (dealing with issues of admissibility, and stating that a
case will be admissible if the State is "unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution").
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Third, the ICC fails to protect important constitutional rights
62
guaranteed to U.S. citizens, such as the right to a jury trial.
The Rome Statute of 1998 established the ICC.63 However, the
United States has not ratified the agreement. 64 Reasons given by
administration officials for rejecting the treaty included the
unchecked power of the ICC, the threat to U.S. sovereignty posed by
the court, and the risk of politicized prosecutions. 6 5 The ICC grew out
of the war crimes tribunals against officials in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda. 66 As a result, the ICC's jurisdiction is limited mainly to
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the
crime of aggression. 6 7 Most recently, the U.N. Security Council
authorized the ICC to prosecute cases related to the war in the
Darfur region of Sudan. 68 Some groups sent Iraq-related
communications to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, alleging
war crimes committed by United States, including targeting Iraqi
civilians. 69 The Prosecutor ultimately rejected the allegations, but
this incident exemplifies the problems with using the ICC in relation
70
to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The first problem created by the ICC is its power to obtain
jurisdiction over U.S. citizens although the United States has not
ratified the treaty. Under the Rome Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction
over nationals of states that have ratified the ICC or nationals who
71
committed their alleged crimes in states that have ratified the ICC.
Currently, the list of parties to the ICC has reached one hundred
nations, including Afghanistan (but not Iraq). 72 Therefore, the ICC

62.
Id. at art. 67.
63.
Id. at art. 1.
64.
Jeffrey S. Dietz, Comment, Protectingthe Protectors: Can the United States
Successfully Exempt U.S. Persons From the International Criminal Court with U.S.
Article 98 Agreements?, 27 Hous. J. INT'L L. 137, 147 (2004).

65.
Marc Grossman, Under Sec'y for Political Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State,
Remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (May 6, 2002).
66.
Coal. for the Int'l Crim. Ct., A Timeline of the Establishment and Work of
the International Criminal Court, http://www.iccnow.org/
documents/ CICCFS Timeline current.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
67.
Dietz, supra note 64, at 150.
68.
Juan Forero, Bush's Aid Cuts on Court Issue Roil Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 19, 2005, at Al.
69.
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the Int'l Crim. Ct., Statement to
Citizens Concerned about Loss of Life in Iraq (Feb. 9, 2006), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTPletter to sendersre-Iraq-9-February2006.pdf.
70.
Id. The Prosecutor examined the evidence, including statistics on precisionguided weapons, and found that there was no "reasonable basis" to determine that an
excessive attack within the jurisdiction of the Court had been committed." Id.
71.

Rome Statute, supra note 60, at art. 12.

72.
See Int'l Crim. Ct. (ICC), The States Parties to the Rome Statute,
http://www.icccpi.int/asp/statesparties.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
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could have jurisdiction over U.S. civilians accused of detainee abuse
in Afghanistan.
In response to the broad jurisdiction of the ICC, Congress passed
the Ameriqan Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, which among
other things, prohibits military assistance to states that participate
in the ICC and prohibits cooperation with the ICC. 73 The President
can lift those restrictions on a foreign state if that state enters into an
Article 98 agreement, wherein the foreign state agrees to prevent the
74
ICC from exercising jurisdiction over U.S. citizens.
Two types of Article 98 agreements enable the United States to
skirt the ICC's jurisdiction. The first type of agreement requires
either the United States or the foreign state to gain the consent of the
other before sending the other state's citizens to the ICC. 75 Since the
United States has no intention of participating in the ICC, this
effectively takes the ICC option off the table.7 6 The second type of ICC
agreement provides only immunity for U.S. citizens and is used less
frequently. 77 The United States has entered into approximately one
hundred Article 98 agreements and will continue to use these
agreements in order to limit the jurisdiction of the ICC. 78 For
example, in September 2002, the United States entered into a key
79
Article 98 agreement with the government of Afghanistan.
The second problem with the ICC is the potential for abuse by
opponents of U.S. foreign policy. Under its guidelines, the ICC cannot0
8
seek to prosecute an individual who is being investigated by a state.
However, if the United States conducts a thorough investigation of an
alleged case of detainee abuse and decides not to prosecute the
accused individual, the ICC can still take the case if it determines
that the decision not to prosecute resulted from the "unwillingness" or
"inability" of the United States to prosecute the case.81 This vague
language can create the potential for politically motivated prosecution
by countries or individuals. Human-rights expert Richard Dicker of
Human Rights Watch contends that some countries or politicians
may want to manipulate the ICC and employ it "as a political
82
battering ram" to undermine the policies of foreign heads of state.

73.

Dietz, supra note 64, at 147.
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
Forero, supra note 68, at Al.
79.
Agreement Between the Government of the Transitional Islamic State of
Afghanistan and the Government of the United States of America Regarding the
Surrender of Persons to the International Criminal Court, U.S.-Afg., Sept. 20, 2002,
availableat http://foia.state.gov/documents/IntAgreements/000OB947.pdf.
80.
Dietz, supra note 64, at 150.
81.
Rome Statute, supra note 60, at art. 17.
82.
Forero, supra note 68, at Al.
74.
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One State Department official has noted that "[t]he exposure faced by
the United States goes well beyond people on active duty and it
includes decision-makers in our government. '8 3 This prediction came
true shortly after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, when an anti-war
Belgian legislator filed a suit at the ICC against General Tommy
84
Franks, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, alleging war crimes.
Finally, the ICC does not provide the same constitutional
protections as U.S. courts. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution
8 5
In
provides a right to a jury trial in all criminal prosecutions.
contrast, the ICC is composed of eighteen judges from states that
have ratified the agreement.8 6 Three of the judges in the Trial
Division then conduct the trial.8 7 Thus, it is entirely possible
(although not probable) that a U.S. civilian could be tried and
sentenced by a panel of judges from such bastions of human rights as
Cambodia-to name three countries
Sierra Leone, Venezuela, 8 and
8
that have ratified the ICC.
Because of the ICC's ability to obtain jurisdiction over U.S.
citizens absent the consent of the U.S. government, the potential for
political manipulation of the court, and the lack of constitutional
protections the court would provide U.S. citizens, the ICC is not a
feasible solution to address the problem of detainee abuse by U.S.
civilians in combat zones.
B. Host Country Justice
Another alternative that may seem to hold promise, but is
ultimately impractical, is granting jurisdiction over such cases to the
host countries in which the alleged offenses occur. However, the
judicial systems in these countries often produce chaotic trials that
would fail to meet even minimal standards of justice.
The strange case of Jack Idema, an intriguing bounty hunter,
exemplifies the dangers of host country justice with its dramatic
resolution in a tense Afghanistan courtroom. Jack Idema, a former
Special Forces solider, was convicted of abuse by an Afghan judge.8 9 A
native New Yorker, Idema headed to Afghanistan after the 9/11
attacks to hunt for Bin Laden.90 Idema was a colorful character with
a checkered past. Idema served in the Army's Special Forces and
trained foreign militaries, but he was also convicted of wire fraud

83.
84.

Id.
Dietz, supra note 64, at 146.

85.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Rome Statute, supra note 60, at art. 36.
Id. at art. 39.
See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 72.
Bergen, supranote 9, at 61.
Id. at 57.
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during the mid-1990s. 91 In addition, Idema once sued DreamWorks
for $130 million, audaciously claiming that DreamWorks' film The
Peacemaker, which starred George Clooney as a U.S. solider who
on Idema's
broke up a Russian nuclear smuggling ring, based its 9plot
2
life experiences without first receiving his permission.
Upon traveling to Afghanistan, Idema quickly continued his
penchant for bravado and publicity seeking, striking up relationships
with journalists in Kabul. 9 3 In one instance Idema provided
videotapes to CBS News showing Islamic rebels performing military
training, tapes that were broadcast on 60 Minutes II in January
2002. 94 Along with Brent Bennett, a former solider in the 82nd
Airborne; Ed Caraballo, a cameraman who worked with ABC News;
and several Afghani assistants and translators, Idema formed a
paramilitary operation he called Task Force Saber 7 and began
tracking down terrorists such as Osama Bin Laden, Mullah Omar,
95
and other Taliban members.
On July 5, 2004, Afghani police raided a private prison operated
by Idema and his associates. 96 Inside, they discovered three men
hanging upside down and several who had been beaten in another
room. 97 Included among the three men was Afghan Supreme Court
Judge Maulawi Siddiqullah. 98 Afghani police arrested Idema and the
other members of Task Force 7, and a trial began shortly thereaftera trial that showcased the perils and pitfalls of justice in a foreign
99
land with an underdeveloped judicial system.
Idema and his co-conspirators presented a spirited defense,
arguing that they were acting with the support of the U.S.
government. Several pieces of evidence lent some support to that
claim. First, an U.S. military spokesman admitted that the Army had
detained a prisoner who had been turned over by Idema.O ° Second,
the judge conceded that Idema had saved the life of the Afghan
Education Minister. 01 Third, the FBI revealed that it had taken
documents from Idema's house and returned them to the defense
lawyers three weeks later, with several documents missing. i2

91.
Id.
Duncan Campbell & Kitty Logan, The Man Who Thinks He's George
92.
Clooney: A Story of Today's Kabul, THE GUARDIAN (London), July 9, 2004, at 1.
93.
Bergen, supra note 9, at 58.
94.
Id.
Id. at 59.
95.
Rein,
Jonathan Turley, Privatizationof the Military Gives 'Contractors'Free
96.
J. GAZETTE (Fort Wayne, Ind.), Sept. 22, 2004, at 9.
97.
Id.
98.
Bergen, supra note 9, at 61.
See id.
99.
Id.
100.
Id.
101.
102.
Id.
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between
Finally, Idema's lawyers played tapes of conversations
10 3
Idema and officials in the Department of Defense.
Irregularities plagued the proceedings throughout. During the
case, the presiding Afghan judge, Abdul Baset Bakhtiari, had
noticeable difficulty understanding the taped conversations, which
were poorly translated and hard to follow. 10 4 In addition, Judge
denied Idema the opportunity to cross-examine
Bakhtiari
witnesses.105 Despite the evidence and irregularities in the
proceeding, Idema and Bennett were swiftly sentenced to a ten-year
06
prison term, while Caraballo received an eight-year sentence.i
Caraballo's lawyer summed up the case: "The United States knew
about operatives catching terrorists they didn't want the world to
know about. The easiest way to deal with them was to put them
before a kangaroo court and leave them to rot in an Afghan
prison." 10 7 An appeals court later reduced Idema's sentence to five
years, Bennett's sentence to three years, and Caraballo's sentence to
two years.' 0 8 In December 2004, several of Idema's fellow prisoners at
Pul-e-Charki prison attempted to kill the three prisoners in a
surprise attack, but prison guards ultimately repelled the attack.' 0 9
President Hamid Karzai released Caraballo on April 30, 2006, three
months shy of his two-year sentence, but did not reduce the sentences
of Idema or Bennett. n ° While Jack Idema's checkered past and
bizarre behavior did not endear him to members of the U.S. public or
the media, serious questions can be raised about the conduct of the
Afghan court and the Afghan judicial system in general.
The nascent Iraqi legal system also seems disorganized and
unwieldy, most visibly in the trial of Saddam Hussein. That trial has
been characterized by a raucous atmosphere in which the former
Iraqi dictator has yelled at the judge, thrown papers, and stormed out
of the courtroom." 1 In addition, several judges and lawyers have
been murdered during the past year. 112 Given the strength of the
Iraqi insurgency and the negative publicity about the Abu Ghraib
scandal, it is not difficult to imagine that putting a U.S. contractor on

Id.
103.
104.
Carlotta Gall, Mercenariesin Afghan Case Get 8 to 10 Years in Prison,N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2004, at A12.
Turley, supranote 96, at 9.
105.
Gall, supra note 104, at A12.
106.
107.
Nick Meo, Pentagon Hitman or Fantasist? Action!, INDEP. ON SUNDAY
(London), Nov. 28, 2004, at 21.
3 Sentences for Torture are Reduced, FORT WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, Apr. 1,
108.
2005, at A29.
Bergen, supra note 9, at 63.
109.
110.
Carlotta Gall, Karzai's Holiday PardonsSet an American Free, N.Y. TIMES,
May 1, 2006, at 1.
Salvaging Saddam Hussein's Trial, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 16, 2006, at 12.
111.
Id.
112.
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trial in Iraq would result in a very dangerous courtroom that could
not be trusted to conduct a fair trial.
Because of the instability of the judicial systems in foreign
countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq and the lack of adequate legal
protections, foreign courts in those countries do not hold much
promise as a suitable venue for trying U.S. civilians accused of
abusing detainees.
C. Justice in U.S. Courts
The remaining legal option for trying such accused individuals is
the U.S. legal system. U.S. courts can protect the rights of the
accused and provide the swift judicial administration and sensitivity
that these cases require. Several civil and criminal remedies exist for
addressing the problem of detainee abuse by U.S. civilians in war
zones, but solutions such as the ATS and the War Crimes Act
ultimately have fatal flaws that render their application to most cases
very problematic.
1. Civil Remedies
Judicial interpretation has rendered civil remedies to the
detainee abuse problem inadequate and ineffective. The ATS, also
known as the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), is a law that has been on
the books since the country's founding, and it establishes the
potential for civil justice for alleged victims of abuse or torture." 3 The
ATS states, "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States."" 4 The law has been
infrequently invoked throughout U.S. history but has come under
intense scrutiny recently, especially after a 1980 decision that
'' 5
interpreted the phrase "the law of nations" contained in the ATS. 1
In that case, Filartigav. Pena-Irala,the plaintiff sued the defendant,
116
the Inspector General of Police in Paraguay, for torturing his son.
The plaintiff sued under the ATS, and the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the defendant had violated the law of nations
because "an act of torture committed by a state official against one
held in detention violates established norms of the international law
of human rights, and hence the law of nations. 11 7 Since that seminal

113.
See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (established by
First Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789).
114.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (2005).
115.
Mark W. Bina, Comment, Private Military Contractor Liability and
Accountability After Abu Ghraib, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1237, 1253-54 (2005).
116.
Filartiga,630 F.2d at 878.
117.
Id. at 880.
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case, there has been considerable disagreement among the Courts of
Appeals over whether the ATS reaches torture committed by private
118
actors.
The Second Circuit, in Kadic v. Karadzic, addressed the issue of
whether the ATS applies to private actors as well as state officials. 1 19
In that case, victims of the Bosnian genocide sued the President of
the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb Republic, an unrecognized
government entity, under the ATS. 120 Judge Newman, writing for the
majority, stated that "certain forms of conduct violate the law of
nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a
state or only as private individuals.,' 121 The court held that those
certain forms of conduct for which private actors could be liable
included piracy, genocide, and war crimes, although it also held that
"torture ...when not perpetrated in the course of genocide or war
crimes [is] proscribed by international law only when committed by
state officials or under color of law."'122 The D.C. Circuit, in one of
three concurring opinions in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
declined "to read section 1350 [of the ATS] to cover torture by nonstate actors, absent guidance from the Supreme Court on the
statute's usage of the term 'law of nations." 123 This decision was later
reinforced by the D.C. Circuit in Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, where
the court held that claims of torture and abduction were not
ATS, since the ATS did not apply to "private,
actionable under the
124
non-state conduct."'
The Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to weigh in on
the issue in the 2004 case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain but declined to
do so. In Sosa, a Mexican citizen, abducted to the United States from
Mexico by Mexican policemen and U.S. DEA agents to stand trial for
murder, sued under the ATS. 125 In Sosa, the Court held that the ATS
is "a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action."'1 26 The
Court then noted that kidnapping "violates no norm of customary
international law so well defined as to support the creation of a
federal remedy."'127 However, the Court also remarked in a footnote
that "[a] related consideration is whether international law extends

See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206-07 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
118.
(holding claims of torture and abduction aren't actionable under the ATS when
committed by private actors).
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995).
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 237.
Id.at 239.

122.
Id. at 239-40, 243.
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
123.
(Edwards, J., concurring).
Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 206-07.
124.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 692 (2004).
125.
Id. at 724.
126.
127.

Id. at 738.
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the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator
being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or
individual."'128 The Supreme Court's failure to address the issue
directly affected a recent case involving contractors at Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq.
Shortly after the Abu Ghraib scandal surfaced in the media,
Iraqi citizens who had been imprisoned there sued the Titan
Corporation and CACI, two military contractors who provided
interpreters and interrogators at the infamous prison. 129 The Iraqis
claimed they had been tortured-forced to endure sleep deprivation,
attacks by dogs, and other humiliating treatment. 13 0 Noting that the
Supreme Court had failed to address the issue of whether the ATS
covers private conduct, the District Court judge in Ibrahim v. Titan
held that under the precedents of Tel-Oren and Sanchez-Espinoza,
the allegations of torture were "not actionable under the Alien Tort
13 1
Statute's grant of jurisdiction, as a violation of the law of nations."
Another case, Saleh v. Titan, began in the Southern District of
California but was transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia in
March 2005.132 After again being transferred to the D.C. Circuit, the
Judge dismissed the ATS complaint, noting that "there is no middle
ground between private action and government action, at least for
'133
purposes of the Alien Tort Statute.
The conflicts among the Circuits coupled with the Supreme
Court's refusal to address whether the ATS can be used to sue private
actors for alleged torture violations makes the ATS an unstable and
inadequate legal approach to the problem. An alternative to the ATS
is the Torture Victims Protection Act. Congress enacted the Torture
Victim Protection Act in 1991 to comply with its U.N. obligations,
specifically the Convention Against Torture. 134 The Act creates a civil
action for torture and states, "An individual who, under actual or
apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation ...

subjects

an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages
to that individual."'135 Because the statute specifically requires that
an alleged torturer act under "authority" of a foreign government, it
would not apply to U.S. contractors or bounty hunters accused of
torture. The lack of civil remedies for victims of U.S. civilians who
abuse or torture detainees may disappoint alleged victims, but that

128.
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130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
73, 73-74
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Saleh v. Titan, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1171 (S.D. Cal. 2005).
Saleh v. Titan, 436 F. Supp. 2d 55, 58 (D.D.C. 2006).
Bina, supra note 115, at 1256.
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failure does not preclude the application of U.S. criminal law to the
problem.
2. Criminal Remedies
Federal prosecutors can use several criminal laws to prosecute
U.S. civilians accused of detainee abuse. One of the most prominent
laws, the War Crimes Act, seems well suited to address detainee
abuse by civilians in war zones since cruel treatment and torture are
war crimes.' 36 The War Crimes Act states, "Whoever, whether inside
or outside the United States, commits a war crime .. .shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both,
and if death results to the victim, shall also be subject to the penalty
of death."'137 The Act requires that the accused war criminal be "a
member of the Armed Forces of the United State or a national of the
United States. ''13s A war crime is defined as "a grave breach in any of
the international conventions signed at Geneva 12 August 1949, or
any protocol to such convention to which the United States is a
139
party."
The convention referred to in the War Crimes Act that applies to
civilians who abuse foreign prisoners is commonly referred to as the
Third Geneva Convention, or the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War. 140 Article Three of the Third Geneva
Convention requires states to comply with the following provisions "in
cases of armed conflict not of an international character" occurring
within the territory of a signatory state:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities . . . shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any
other similar criteria. To that end, the following acts are and shall
remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with
respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and
degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted

136.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a), (c)(1) (2000); Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention].
137.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2441(a) (2005).
138.
139.
140.

Id. at. § 2441(b).
Id. at § 2441(c)(1).
Geneva Convention, supra note 136, 6 U.S.T. at 3317.
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court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
141
indispensable by civilized peoples.

The Bush administration has maintained that the War Crimes
Act does not address any of the cases of U.S. civilians who abuse
detainees since the protections of the Third Geneva Convention do
142
not apply to members of al-Qaeda or other terrorist organizations.
The administration has stated that al-Qaeda is "an international
terrorist group and cannot be considered a state party to the Geneva
Convention. Its members, therefore, are not covered by the Geneva
1 43
Convention, and are not entitled to POW status under the treaty.'
However, administration officials decided that Taliban members
could possibly be covered "because Afghanistan is a party to the
1 44

Convention."'

The Administration also believes that language in Article Four of
the Third Geneva Convention shows that the Geneva Convention did
not apply to suspects captured in Afghanistan or Iraq. 145 Under the

141.
142.

Id. at art. 3.
Article Two lays out the standards for applicability of the Convention:

In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the
territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no
armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in
their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in
relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions
thereof.
Id. at art. 2. A list of the state parties can be found at: http://www.icrc.orgWeb/eng/
siteengO.nsf/htmlallparty-gc/$File/Conventions%20de%2Geneve%20et%2OProtocoles
%20additionnels%20ENG.pdf
Note that the case of Jack Idema would be handled under the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War since the alleged torture
victim was a non-combatant civilian. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516.
143.
Press Release, Off. of the Press Sec'y, Statement by the Press Secretary on
the Geneva Convention (May 7, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2003/05/print20030507-18.html.
144.
Id.
145.
Id. Article Four of the Convention states that:
Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging
to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:
(1)
(2)

Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps,
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party

2006]
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definition of prisoners of war in Article Four, the White House
determined that "Taliban detainees are not entitled POW status"
because they "have not effectively distinguished themselves from the
civilian population of Afghanistan" and "have not conducted their
146
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war."
Despite that evidence, Article Five of the Third Geneva
Convention addresses situations where it is questionable whether or
not prisoners of war qualify under Article Four. That provision states
that:
The present Convention shall apply to the persons referred to in Article
4 from the time they fall into the power of the enemy and until their
final release and repatriation. Should any doubt arise as to whether
persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the
hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in
Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present
Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a
147
competent tribunal.

For several years, the United States failed to hold any so-called
Article Five tribunals to determine the status of detainees. However,

to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this
territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps,
including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following
conditions :

(3)
(4)

(a)

that of being commanded by a person responsible
subordinates;

(b)

that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance

(c)

that of carrying arms openly;

(d)

that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war.

for his

Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government
or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.
Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being
members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war
correspondents, supply contractors, members of labor units or of services
responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have
received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who
shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the
annexed model.

(5)

Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the
merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the
conflict, who do not benefit by more favorable treatment under any other
provisions of international law.

(6)

Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the
enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without
having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided
they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.

Geneva Convention, supra note 136, at art. 4.
146.
Press Release, supra note 143.
147.
Geneva Convention, supra note 136, at art. 5.
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several Kuwaiti and Australian detainees, interned at the U.S.
facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, challenged their detention in the
case of Rasul v. Bush. 148 Each detainee claimed that he had never
"been a combatant against the United States or.. . engaged in any
terrorist acts."'1 4 9 The Supreme Court held in Rasul that "the federal
courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the Executive's
potentially indefinite detention of individuals who claim to be wholly
innocent of wrongdoing." 150 As a result of that decision, the Pentagon
ordered Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) for all
151
detainees at Guantanamo Bay.
The Pentagon Order laid out the process by which the CSRTs
would take place. The Order defined "enemy combatant" as anyone
"part of or supporting Taliban or al-Qaeda forces, or associated forces
that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners."'152 The Pentagon then granted each detainee "the
opportunity to contest designation as an enemy combatant" before a
tribunal consisting of "three neutral commissioned officers of the U.S.
Armed Forces."'1 53 The detainee would have the right to call witnesses
154
and introduce evidence at trial.
After conducting the hearing, the CSRTs would "determine in
closed session by majority vote whether the detainee is properly
detained as an enemy combatant."' 155 The standard used would be
"[p]reponderance of the evidence," but there would be a "rebuttable
presumption in favor of the Government's evidence. ''156 If the CSRT
determined that a detainee was not an enemy combatant, the
detainee could be transferred or released to his country of
citizenship. 157 Since the order creating the CSRTs, the military has
conducted 558 tribunals and found that thirty-eight detainees did not
qualify as enemy combatants, and these detainees were subsequently
released.158
The CSRTs were challenged by several detainees and their
attorneys. Salim Ahmad Hamdan, a detainee at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, who had been captured in Afghanistan in 2001, challenged his
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149.
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detention claiming it violated the Geneva Convention. 159 In Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld, decided in November 2004, the District Court Judge,
James Robertson, rejected the government's claim that Hamdan was
not covered by the Geneva Convention because he "was captured, not
in the course of a conflict between the United States and Afghanistan,
160
but in the course of a 'separate' conflict with al-Qaeda."'
First, Judge Robertson relied on an amicus brief and a
memorandum by the State Department to hold. that "the
government's attempt to separate the Taliban from al Qaeda for
Geneva Convention purposes finds no support in the structure of the
Conventions themselves, which are triggered by the place of the
conflict, and not by what particular faction a fighter is associated
with."'161 Second, the Judge held that even though a CSRT
determined that Hamdan was a member of al-Qaeda, that failed to
demonstrate that "a competent tribunal has determined that
1 62
Hamdan is not a prisoner-of-war under the Geneva Conventions."'
Even though the President had determined that all "detained alQaeda members [were] not prisoners-of-war under the Geneva
Conventions," that does not meet the Convention's requirements
' ' 63
since "the President is not a 'tribunal."
Soon after the ruling, the government appealed the case to the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. That decision, filed in July 2005, held
that the Geneva Convention "did not apply to al-Qaeda members"
because "al-Qaeda is not a state and was not a 'High Contracting
Party' to the Convention.' 1 64 In addition, the court held that the
CSRTs met the Geneva Convention's standard as a "competent
tribunal" to determine Hamdan's status. 16 5 On November 7, 2005, the
Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to hear the case. 166 Chief
Justice John Roberts declined to participate in the case, since he was
part of the three-judge panel that ruled on the case in the D.C.
16 7
Circuit.
The Supreme Court issued its ruling in Hamdan on June 29,
2006.168 First, the Court tackled the issue of jurisdiction. The Court
noted that subsection (e)(1) of § 1005 of the Detainee Treatment Act,
signed into law on December 30, 2005, provided that "no court,
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justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider . . . an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien
detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. ' 169 The Court also noted that Paragraph 2 of subsection (e) of
the Detainee Treatment Act "vests in the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit the exclusive jurisdiction to determine
the validity of any final decision of a [CSRT] that an alien is properly
designated as an enemy combatant."'170 The Court recognized that
§ 1005(h) contained an "effective date provision" stating that
"Paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (e) shall apply with respect to
any claim whose review is governed by one of such paragraphs and
171
that is pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act."'
The Government moved to dismiss Hamdan, maintaining that due to
the aforementioned
subsections, the Supreme Court lacks
1 72
"jurisdiction to review the Court of Appeals' decision below."'
After reviewing common law and the legislative history, the
Court held that it had jurisdiction over the case and denied the
motion to dismiss. 173 Specifically, the Court noted that the
Government accepted that "only paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection
(e) are expressly made applicable to pending cases."'1 74 Since
Hamdan's action was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and not a
challenge of "any 'final' decision of a CSRT or military commission,
his action
does not fall within the scope of subsection (e)(2) or
175
(e)(3).''
After establishing jurisdiction, the Court delved into the issues of
the case, including the applicability of Geneva Convention protections
to Hamdan and other captured individuals. The Government argued
that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, which applies to
conflicts "not of an international character occurring in the territory
of one of the High Contracting Parties," did not apply to the conflict
between the United States and al-Qaeda since that conflict is
"international in scope."'1 76 However, the Court reasoned that since
Article 2 applied to conflicts "between two or more High Contracting
Parties," the phrase "not of an international character" in Article 3
should be interpreted "in contradistinction to a conflict between
nations."'1 77 Thus, the conflict between the United States and alQaeda qualified for Article 3 protection because that Article protects
"individuals associated with neither a signatory nor even a
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nonsignatory 'Power' who are involved in a conflict 'in the territory of
a signatory.' 178 The Court concluded that military commissions failed
to meet the standards of the Geneva Convention because they did not
involve "regularly constituted" courts or provide "all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples," such as giving the accused the right to be present at trial
179
and the right to have access to the evidence in the case.
The effect of the Hamdan ruling cannot yet be entirely
ascertained, but the case provoked a quick response from government
officials. On July 7, 2006, the Office of the Secretary of Defense sent
out a memorandum ordering all Department of Defense personnel to
"promptly review all relevant directives, regulations, policies,
practices, and procedures under your purview to ensure that they
comply with the standards of Common Article 3."i80 A prominent U.S.
Senator has remarked that the Hamdan ruling "opened up a can of
worms. You could have a situation if we don't bring some restraint
where anybody who has done anything to an al-Qaeda suspect that's
harsh could be prosecuted."' iS 1 The former general counsel for the
C.I.A. conjectured that interrogators would refrain from "any
arguably abusive behavior" due to fear of potential War Crimes Act
prosecutions. 8 2 This
exact fear
so concerned the Bush
Administration, that then-White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales
8 3
addressed the issue in a January 25, 2002 memo to the President.
Gonzales concluded that declaring the inapplicability of Geneva
Convention prisoner of war status to al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees
''substantially reduces the threat of domestic criminal prosecution
under the War Crimes Act."'1 4 White House Counsel was especially
worried about the "undefined" language of the Convention such as
"inhuman treatment," and the possibility of "unwarranted charges"
l 5
based on the War Crimes Act. s
The administration and Congress have pledged to work together
on the issue of detainee abuse, given that legal experts agree that
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future cases of detainee abuse could be placed in the category of war
crimes. 186 The acting Assistant Attorney General recently testified
before Congress, urging it to "bring clarity and certainty to Common
Article Three" of the Geneva Convention. 187 One Senator suggested
that Congress could limit Article Three " in a way that resembled the
language of the measure setting standards for the treatment of
detainees" that became law last year. 88 In response, the Bush
Administration recently submitted a draft to Congress that narrows
the list of actions that could be prosecuted under the War Crimes
Act. 189 That draft included torture as a prosecutable offense under
the War Crimes Act but excluded outrages upon personal dignity and
humiliating and degrading treatment. 190 Although no U.S. civilian
has ever been prosecuted under the War Crimes Act, the Army's
Judge Advocate General believes that the proposed changes to the
legislation may encourage future prosecutions by elevating the War
Crimes Act "from an inspiration to an instrument."' 191
Congress debated the revised War Crimes Act legislation in fall
2006, trying to resolve the difficult and vexing question of how
narrowly to define interrogation techniques that may subject
interrogators to War Crimes Act prosecution. 192 In late September,
Congress approved the Military Commissions Act, which established
that certain acts are prosecutable under the War Crimes Act,
including torture, rape, murder, and any act intended to cause
serious physical or mental pain or suffering. 19 3 The Act also gave the
President wide discretion to authorize other interrogation techniques
and interpret which techniques constitute grave breaches of the
Geneva Convention. 19 4 President Bush signed the bill into law in
October 2006, and it has already generated several legal
challenges. 195 However, it should be noted that some experts believe
it is unrealistic to expect that federal prosecutors would bring any
indictments for violations of the War Crimes Act. 196
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Until the uncertainty surrounding the War Crimes Act is
resolved, prosecutors must utilize other alternatives to tackle the
problem of U.S. civilians accused of torturing detainees to bring those
perpetrators to justice efficiently and effectively. This Note proposes a
solution that requires U.S. courts to first establish jurisdiction over
the civilian accused of detainee abuse via the MEJA and the Patriot
Act, and then prosecute the accused individual using an existing
criminal statute such as felony assault or murder. This approach is
currently being utilized in the case of David Passaro, the first civilian
charged with detainee abuse in Afghanistan or Iraq. 197 Going
forward, the United States should utilize and emphasize the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 because it standardizes interrogation
techniques, applies to all detainees regardless of location, and allows
for a reasonable defense for the accused.

IV. MOVING FORWARD IN FUTURE CASES
A. Using MEJA and the PatriotAct to Establish Jurisdiction
The first step in criminal prosecutions of U.S. contractors or
bounty hunters accused of detainee abuse is to establish jurisdiction.
In 2000, Congress passed the MEJA, which gave federal courts
jurisdiction over crimes committed outside the territorial boundaries
of the United States. 198 However, the MEJA remained limited to only
two groups of U.S. citizens: members of the armed forces or
contractors "employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside
of the United States."'199 The statute defined individuals "employed by
the Armed Forces" as were employees or contractors of the
Department of Defense but did not extend to employees or contractors
affiliated with other government agencies or entities. 20 0 In addition,
the MEJA limited the definition of those "accompanying the Armed
20 1
Forces" to dependents of service members.
Congress addressed the shortcomings of the MEJA with the
Patriot Act and an amendment to the MEJA during the 2005
legislative session. The Patriot Act expanded the "special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States" to include "the
premises of United States diplomatic, consular, military or other
United States Government mission or entities in foreign States,
including the buildings, parts of buildings, and land appurtenant or

197.
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'20 2
ancillary thereto or used for purposes of those missions or entities.
This broad language encompasses most overseas detention facilities,
giving prosecutors the necessary jurisdiction to bring detainee abuse
cases.
Congress amended the MEJA to apply to contractors employed
by agencies other than the Department of Defense. 20 3 The legislation
now identifies a civilian as "employed by the Armed Forces" if he or
she is "a contractor (including a subcontractor at any tier) of ... any
other Federal Agency, or any provisional authority, to the extent such
employment relates to supporting the mission of the Department of
Defense overseas. '20 4 However, Congress failed to explain what it
means to support "the mission of the Department of Defense
overseas." 20 5 Contractors working for the CIA or other government
agencies could argue that they were supporting the mission of the
CIA in gathering intelligence, which would be entirely independent of
the "mission of the Department of Defense overseas. '20 6 That claim
remains to be made in future cases, but may prove to be specious
since intelligence gathering and interrogation of suspected terrorists
clearly supports the military's mission. Granted the necessary
jurisdiction, federal prosecutors are now embarking on the first case
of detainee abuse by a civilian interrogator.

B. The Passaro Case:A CriticalFirst Test
The case of David Passaro is the first critical application of the
most effective solution to the problem of detainee abuse by U.S.
civilians in a war zone. Passaro's case is very important to this
developing problem because, as one counterterrorism and national
20 7
security law expert observed, his case is one of first impression.
David Passaro, a civilian contractor employed by the CIA in
Afghanistan, was engaged in "paramilitary activities in support of the
U.S. military base in Kunar province. ''20 8 In June 2003, Passaro
helped to interrogate Abdul Wali, an Afghani suspected of launching
rocket attacks on the U.S. base in Asadabad, Afghanistan-.20 9 Passaro
allegedly kicked and beat Wali repeatedly with a flashlight during
210
several days of interrogation, eventually causing Wali's death.
Federal officials arrested Passaro, a former Army Ranger working at
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Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in June 2004, and a grand jury in North
Carolina indicted him on "two counts of assault with a dangerous
weapon with intent to do bodily211harm and two counts of assault
resulting in serious bodily injury.
The Patriot Act gave federal prosecutors jurisdiction over
Passaro since it extends their jurisdiction to crimes committed on
"the premises of U.S. diplomatic, consular, military or other U.S.
government missions or entities in foreign states. '2 12 Passaro's
lawyers made several arguments that the Patriot Act did not apply to
their client's situation. First, his defense lawyers argued that the U.S.
base in Afghanistan did not fit within the Patriot Act's definition, but
U.S. District Court judge Terence Boyle ruled in August 2005 that the
Asadabad base qualified as "U.S. premises" because U.S. troops
213
resided at the base and used it to support a military mission.
Alternatively, Passaro's defense attorneys argued that the federal
court had no jurisdiction over Passaro and that he should instead be
"subject to the jurisdiction of the Afghan courts." 214 Judge Boyle also
denied that request, maintaining that anyone can be prosecuted for
"alleged criminal misuse" of the authority granted by the
2 15
President.
After establishing U.S. federal court jurisdiction over Passaro,
the parties delved into other important issues such as the
relationship between national security and the use of classified
information. Passaro's defense lawyers gave notice to federal
prosecutors that they planned to disclose government secrets when
the case went to trial.2 16 As a result, Judge Boyle ruled that every
document filed in the case would be reviewed by a court security
officer in order to redact classified information before the document
was released to the public.2 17 In addition, Judge Boyle ordered that a
secure, soundproof room be made available for prosecutors and
defense attorneys to review any and all classified documents. 218
The prosecutors provided classified documents to the judge on
several occasions. 219 However, Judge Boyle denied the defense access
to the information, arguing that it is "not material to the defense, and
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that its disclosure prevents a risk to national security. ' 220 Federal
judges have the authority to determine access to classified material
under the Classified Information Procedures Act.2 21 This law, passed
in 1980, allows judges to conduct a balancing test that weighs the
defendant's right to information that may help his defense against
2 22
the government's right to protect national security.
However, Passaro and his attorneys argued that the judge made
incorrect rulings and was not qualified to determine national security
interests.22 3 In an interview, Passaro stated that his attorneys had
not yet received a copy of the report of the government investigation
into Abdul Wali's death. 224 Passaro claimed that he and his attorneys
often received blank pages with stamps indicating that everything on
those pages was deemed classified. 22 5 Passaro maintained, "They're
just classifying everything. They're not classifying properly. The
judge doesn't know any better. My attorneys are having a very
difficult time putting together an adequate defense due to the
'226
government's deceptive practices.
As Passaro failed in many of his motions, he became increasingly
frustrated during the course of the trial. In November 2005, Passaro
attempted to fire his federal public defenders and replace them with a
private attorney. 227 However, Judge Boyle ruled that the private
attorney could only work as a co-counsel in the case because it would
take too long for the attorney to get the appropriate security
22 8
clearances and the trial had already been delayed.
The outcome of the Passaro trial would ultimately rest with
Judge Boyle's decision on whether or not Passaro could establish a
"public authority" defense. 229 In a public authority defense, Passaro
would claim that he had the public authority granted by the
government to use force during Wali's interrogation and that Passaro
cannot be prosecuted for his actions. 230 In February 2006, Judge
Boyle agreed to let Passaro present evidence of the defense and said
he would determine at trial "whether the facts in this case warrant a
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public authority defense. ' 231 However, Judge Boyle ruled just before
Passaro's trial that Passaro could not use classified CIA memoranda
and other documents since he failed to show who approved of his
232
actions in the interrogation.
On August 7, 2006, David Passaro's trial began with a blow to
the defense when Judge Boyle denied the defense's request to
subpoena key government officials such as former CIA Director
George Tenet. 233 The government presented several witnesses,
including military personnel and CIA agents in disguise to hide their
identities, who testified that Passaro beat Wali severely.2 3 4 After
testimony from medical experts on the cause of Wali's death, the
government rested on Friday, August 11, 2006.235
Passaro's attorneys presented a brief defense that focused on the
cause of Wali's death. A forensic pathologist testified that Wali did
not receive a fractured pelvis or ruptured intestine and that he did
not see any evidence of "extreme physical pain. ' 23 6 The testimony of
medical experts was crucial to the case since Wali's relatives refused
an autopsy because it violated Islamic law. 237 On Thursday, August
18, 2006, the jury returned its verdict, convicting Passaro of one
2 38
count of felony assault and three counts of misdemeanor assault.
Passaro now faces between two and eleven and a half years in prison
when he is sentenced. 239 After his conviction, his lawyers filed an
appeal that asks a federal judge to enter a judgment of acquittal for
240
Passaro since the verdict was not backed by sufficient evidence.
Although some human rights officials were disappointed with
the verdict, Passaro's case may spur the Department of Justice to
prosecute some of the twenty CIA agents and civilian contractors in
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Afghanistan and Iraq accused of detainee abuse. 241 After the verdict,
CIA Director William Hayden wrote to all CIA employees that
"Passaro's actions were unlawful, reprehensible, and neither
authorized nor condoned by the Agency," and prosecutors noted that
"the verdict sent a message around the world that justice will be
24 2
secured for anyone unjustly harmed in America's wars.
The Passaro case, as could be reasonably expected, has
illuminated some legal issues created by deficiencies in U.S. law that
existed at the time of his indictment. These issues included the
applicability of U.S. law to detainee abuse committed abroad and the
defenses available to the accused. To comprehensively resolve the
legal issues involved in detainee abuse cases and declare the firm
opposition of the United States to the practice, Congress enacted the
Detainee Treatment Act in late 2005, a well-crafted piece of
legislation that can serve as a model for future prosecution of U.S.
2 43
civilians accused of detainee abuse.
C. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005: Closing the Loopholes
The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 attempted to close loopholes
created by existing U.S. criminal laws and demonstrate to the world
that the United States intended to address the problem of detainee
abuse. In 1994, Congress first enacted the Torture Statute. 244 The
statute provides that, "Whoever outside the United States commits or
attempts to commit torture shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results to
any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be
2 45
punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life."
Torture is defined as "an act committed by a person acting under the
color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental
pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful
sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical
control.

' 246

In 2002, a memorandum to then-White House Counsel Alberto
Gonzales from the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel
counseled that an interrogation technique qualified as physical
torture only if it was "equivalent in intensity to the pain
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure,

241.
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impairment of bodily function, or even death. '247 An interrogation
technique would be considered mental torture only if it caused
psychological harm that lasted for "months or even years. '248 This
memorandum was leaked to the media in summer 2004 and was soon
rejected by numerous legal scholars, causing the Department of
Justice to repudiate its findings. 249 However, the controversy
surrounding detainee abuse eventually resulted in a new law
concerning the treatment of detainees, the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005.250

The Detainee Treatment Act, notably sponsored by Senator John
McCain (a former prisoner of war) as an amendment to the
Department of Defense Appropriations bill, contains four primary
provisions. 251 First, the Act establishes the U.S. Army Field Manual
as the standard in detainee interrogation, stating that detainees shall
not be "subject to any treatment or technique of interrogation not
authorized by and listed in the United States Army Field Manual on
Intelligence
Interrogation. '252 This has the advantage
of
standardizing interrogation techniques and was supported by a
coalition of retired military officers in a letter to Senator McCain, who
referred to the Army Field Manual as the "gold standard" of
interrogation techniques. 253 However, the Pentagon opposed this
effort, claiming that "restricting techniques to those published in the
manual would make it still easier for captured terrorists to anticipate
'254
and resist interrogations.
The Pentagon recently edited the Army Field Manual to include
specific, detailed examples of approved and prohibited interrogation
techniques. 25 5 Prohibited techniques include "stripping prisoners,
keeping them in stressful positions for a long time, imposing dietary
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restrictions, employing police dogs to intimidate prisoners, and using
sleep deprivation as a tool to get them to talk. '256 The Pentagon
recently delayed the release of the updated Army Field Manual after
Congress objected to "tougher techniques for unlawful combatants
than for traditional prisoners of war. '257 After pressure from
Congress and military officials, the Pentagon decided to drop the plan
for two different sets of interrogation methods and will not include a
classified section in the new manual. 258 The Army finally released the
new intelligence manual, Field Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence
Collector Operations, on September 6, 2006, noting that the new
manual was in "complete compliance with the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005."259
Second, the Detainee Treatment Act eliminates the "color of law"
requirement in the Torture Statute and applies regardless of
location-which should eliminate the issue of defining what
constitutes U.S. premises abroad. The text of the Act states, "No
individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United
States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location,
shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment. ' 260 The Act defines cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment as:
[Tlhe cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment
prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States, as defined in the United States
Reservations, Declarations and Understandings to the United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment done at New York, December 10,
.26
198 4

1

However, it should be noted that there is some debate on what
constitutes "cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment,"
since courts have applied varying interpretations in criminal
26 2
proceedings.
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257.
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Julian E. Barnes, Army Rules Put on Hold, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 2006, at

Al.
258.
Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Rethinking Manual With Interrogation Methods,
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2006; see also Lolita C. Balador, Pentagon Won't Hide
Interrogation Techniques, ABC NEWS, 2006, available at http://www.abcnews.go.com/
Politics/print?id=2072928.
259.
Army Releases New Interrogation Manual, ARMY NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 6,
2006, availableat http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story-id -key=9525.
260.
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 109 Pub. L. No. 148, 119 Stat. 2680 §
1003(a).
261.
Id. § 1003(d).
262.
LEE WOOD, OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF SENATE AMENDMENT CONCERNING
INTERROGATION OF DETAINEES, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (2005), available at
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Third, the Detainee Treatment Act allows for a defense by U.S.
Government personnel accused of torture or abuse in interrogation,
including contractors. The Act states that in civil and criminal actions
where government officials stand accused of crimes involving
detainee interrogation, "it shall be a defense that such officer,
employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent did not know
that the practices were unlawful and a person of ordinary sense and
understanding would not know the practices were unlawful. '263 This
is a key provision that should be acceptable to both the United States
and the international community since it applies something akin to a
"reasonable person" standard to detainee interrogation.
Fourth, and perhaps most controversially, the Detainee
Treatment Act states that "no court, justice, or judge shall have
jurisdiction to hear or consider... an application for a writ of habeas
corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the Department of
Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. '2 64 As previously discussed,
however, the Supreme Court in Hamdan held this provision did not
265
limit the Court's jurisdiction.
Finally, it should be noted that President Bush signed the bill
outlawing unlawful detainee treatment through a "signing
statement. '266 The statement provides that the President will
interpret the law "in a manner consistent with the constitutional
authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive
branch . . . which will assist in achieving the shared objective of the
Congress and the President . . . of protecting the American people
from future terrorist attacks. '267 This could allow the President to
bypass the law and permit torture or abuse in such special situations
as a 'ticking time bomb' scenario," but would not apply in virtually
268
all other cases of U.S. civilians accused of abusing detainees.
By addressing the problem of detainee abuse by U.S. civilians,
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 can provide significant political
and military benefits for the United States in the war on terror. The
problem of detainee abuse has made it more difficult for key allies
such as Afghan President Hamid Karzai to publicly support the
United States and has eroded the support of the public for the wars in

constitute cruel or degrading treatment, while other courts have held that holding a
prisoner in solitary confinement would not constitute such treatment. Id. at 5.
263.
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 109 Pub. L. No. 148, § 1004(a), 119 Stat.
2680.
264.
Id. § 1005(e).
265.
See supra text accompanying notes 168-75.
266.
Savage, supra note 250.
267.
President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the "Department of
Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to address Hurricanes in the Gulf of
Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006," Dec. 30, 2005, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html.
268.
Savage, supra note 250.
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Afghanistan and Iraq.2 6 9 The Detainee Treatment Act, if utilized
consistently and effectively, can combat that decline in support and
''reassure foreign allies that have expressed unease" about the U.S.
failure to observe internationally
accepted human
rights
standards.2 70 Finally, the Detainee Treatment Act will provide muchneeded clarity to both soldiers on the battlefield and the civilians who
2 71
are integral participants in the war on terrorism.

V. CONCLUSION

The problem of detainee abuse by U.S. civilians in Afghanistan
and Iraq is vexing, complex, and still unresolved. Torture and abuse
cast a pall on the valiant actions of soldiers and contractors overseas
in the war on terror and sully the reputation of the United States
across the world, unfairly tarring the United States as a country that
disregards the rule of law. Thus, the problem must be addressed in a
comprehensive and efficient manner.
This Note has argued for U.S. courts to address the matter,
utilizing the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 to close loopholes and
provide much-needed clarity that has been lacking as the detainee
abuse scandal has mushroomed. International legal solutions have
the appearance of being global solutions but pose too many problems,
including vague legal definitions susceptible to manipulation and the
lack of constitutional protections. Host-country justice can often prove
chaotic and inconsistent. Civil actions against bounty hunters or
contractors who abuse detainees remain invalid based on current
legal precedent. This leaves the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 as
the most comprehensive and effective solution to the problem of
detainee abuse by civilians. The Act establishes a uniform standard
for detainee interrogations, closes loopholes related to the location of
the detention, and allows for a reasonable defense for the accused. In
his speech on the Senate floor urging his colleagues to support the
Detainee Treatment Act, Senator John McCain said:
We are Americans, and we hold ourselves to humane standards of
treatment of people no matter how evil or terrible they may be. To do
otherwise undermines our security, but it also undermines our
greatness as a nation. We are not simply any other country. We stand
for something more in the world-a moral mission, one of freedom and
democracy and human rights at home and abroad. We are better than
these terrorists, and we will win. The enemy we fight has no respect for
human life or human rights. They don't deserve our sympathy. But this
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isn't about who they are. This is about who we are. These are the
272
values that distinguish us from our enemies.

The Detainee Treatment Act embodies the cherished and deeply held
values that make the United States a beacon to the world.
Ryan P. Logan'

272.
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